ABSTRACT This paper presents a study on physical layer authentication problem for in vivo nano networks at terahertz (THz) frequencies. A system model based on envisioned nano network for in vivo body-centric nano communication is considered and distance-dependent pathloss based authentication is performed. Experimental data collected from THz time-domain spectroscopy setup shows that pathloss can indeed be used as a device fingerprint. Furthermore, simulation results clearly show that given a maximum tolerable false alarm rate, detection rate up to any desired level can be achieved within the feasible region of the proposed method. It is anticipated that this paper will pave a new paradigm for secured, authenticated nano network for future applications, e.g., drug delivery and Internet of nano-things-based intelligent office.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of novel nano-materials (e.g., graphenebased carbon nano tubes etc.) with remarkable properties, interest in development of nano devices, their interconnectivity to realize the internet of nano things [1] - [4] , and its applicability in biomedical applications [5] is increasing rapidly. When compared with the traditional methods, e.g., endoscopy [6] , the wireless-capable nano-scale devices are less obtrusive and non-invasive in nature which makes them an ideal candidate for the in-vivo biomedical applications [5] , [7] . Terahertz (THz) band (0.1-10 THz) is considered as the most promising band for operation of nano devices [5] , because of its non-ionization and robustness to the fading characteristics.
As of today, there are very limited studies in open literature which discuss nano-scale communication in THz band and its applicability in the biomedical domain [1] , [5] , [8] - [15] . Specifically, the literature so far comprises of the studies which investigate the antenna design [9] , propagation models [10] , transceiver design [11] , [16] , networking issues [12] , [17] , and data rates [18] . Though there have been studies which discuss physical layer authentication in macro-macro interface (see, e.g., [19] and references therein) and micromicro interface (see, e.g., [20] and references therein); to the best of authors' knowledge, no studies have been performed so far to discuss the security and authentication issues related to nano-scale communication at THz frequencies. In this paper, an initial study has been performed where authentication is done based upon a pathloss model (empirically deduced by co-authors of this paper in their previous work [10] ).
The main contributions of this work are the following: i) the proposal of exploiting distance-dependent pathloss as transmitter fingerprint for physical layer authentication at a nano receiver node, ii) experimental verification of i) via THz time-domain spectroscopy setup at QMUL, UK, iii) the algorithmic solution for the proposed authentication method, iv) investigation of performance of proposed method (i.e., detection performance, feasible and non-feasible regions).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section-II introduces the system model. Section-III outlines the details of the proposed authentication method, while Section-IV investigates its performance via two different performance metrics. Numerical results are presented in Section-V. Finally, concluding remarks are drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The envisioned architecture for nano-network based in-vivo healthcare is given in [5] , and is shown in Fig. 1 . The main components of the envisioned architecture include:
• Nano-nodes: simplest devices composed of sensor and communication units, which can transmit to short distance the output of a simple computation.
• Nano-routers: can collect data from a multitude of nano nodes and are capable to send a limited number of commands.
• Nano-micro interface: are hybrid devices able to communicate at both nano and micro/macro paradigm.
• Gateway: or Access point (AP) makes system to work remotely over the Internet.
Based on the architecture given in Fig. 1 , a system model is established to study the authentication problem in nano-networks. Fig. 2 shows the system model used in this study. The model consists of three nano nodes: Alice, Bob and Eve. Alice is the legitimate transmit node, envisioned as an on-body nano-node which sends some control command every once in a while to a legitimate receive node Bob, envisioned as a nano-node present inside the human body. Under the envisioned nano-healthcare scenario, one potential task of the Bob node could be targeted drug delivery. To this end, Bob will perform certain sensing (e.g., measuring cell temperature, blood suger level etc.) periodically, and report it to the on-body nano-node Alice. Then, whenever Bob receives a control command from Alice, it performs targeted drug delivery (by injecting prescribed amount of drug into the target cells). Having motivated a potential nano-healthcare scenario, imagine now a situation, where an intruder node Eve attempts to break into the system by pretending to be Alice and sending a malicious control command to Bob. Such intrusion/impersonation attack, if not thwarted properly, could lead to severe (life threatening) consequences. Therefore, the Bob node must authenticate each and every data packet/control command it receives, in a systematic manner.
III. THE PROPOSED AUTHENTICATION METHOD
This work studies the feature-based authentication problem in nano healthcare networks. Specifically, this work proposes to exploit distance-dependent pathloss as device fingerprint to discriminate the data sent by Alice from that of intruder Eve. At this point, it is worth mentioning that the authentication problem at hand is in principle very similar to the classical problems of detection and classification. Nevertheless, the only important distinction is that in case of authentication problem, the device fingerprint of Eve is unknown. This limitation renders the classical methods (e.g., likelihood ratio test etc.) not applicable to authentication problem. Bayesian methods are also not applicable for the exact same reason. Therefore, Neyman-Pearson based binary hypothesis testing is typically implemented to carry out the authentication task at Bob.
In operational terms, the proposed authentication method consists of two distinct phases, training phase and authentication phase. During the training phase, Bob learns the pathloss of Alice's transmission PL AB (a.k.a the ground truth) via training with Alice on a secure channel. 1 Then later, during the authentication phase, Eve could transmit as well. Therefore, Bob's task is then to authenticate each and every packet it receives on the shared channel. Bob does the authentication by performing binary hypothesis testing on the pathloss measurement extracted from currently received packet. This way, Bob systematically accepts (rejects) the data from Alice (Eve).
This work assumes that all the three nodes (Alice, Bob and Eve) of the considered system model as well as the composition of the fluid medium in between remain stationary. A consequence of this assumption is that the ground truth (PL AB ) becomes a relatively static quantity. This in turn implies that, for the proposed method, the ratio of training phase duration to authentication phase duration (i.e., the training overhead) is very small. However, when either Alice or Bob is mobile (e.g., floating inside blood), or, the composition of the fluid channel between Alice and Bob is dynamic, the ground truth becomes time-varying. In this case, one simple yet elegant approach is that Bob should acquire the ground truth more often. This in turn signifies that the training overhead becomes proportional to the mobility rate of the legitimate nano nodes (Alice and/or Bob). A more sophisticated approach will be to model the mobility of each of the three nano nodes via some appropriate dynamical model (e.g., Brownian motion/Random walk is a well-known and wellacclaimed model to emulate the movement of gas molecules trapped in a box etc.). Nevertheless, we note that the mobility of nano-nodes (and/or the case of dynamic fluid environment) is out of scope of this work.
Before we outline the more fine-grained details of the proposed method, in the next subsection, we first present the rationale behind using pathloss as device fingerprint for discrimination between the transmit nodes (Alice and Eve) as well as the experimental validation of the rationale.
A. PATHLOSS AS DEVICE FINGERPRINT: RATIONALE & EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION
For a point-to-point, on-body/inside-skin, THz Communication system, an (experimentally deduced and thus) accurate pathloss model was recently presented (by the co-authors of this paper) in [10] :
where d is the distance (in mm) between transmit node and receive node, f is the center frequency (in THz), and N is number of sweat ducts. Let's denote by d AB (d EB ) the distance between Alice (Eve) and Bob. Eq. (1) then suggests that pathloss, being distance-dependent, can indeed be used as device fingerprint provided that |d AB − d EB | ≥ η where η is a threshold. Fig. 3 shows the pathloss measurements as a function of frequency (obtained from the THz-TDS setup at QMUL, UK) for two skin samples with different thickness values. Fig. 3 corroborates the pathloss model of Eq. (1) and attests to the fact that the pathloss is indeed distance (thickness) dependent.
B. BINARY HYPOTHESIS TESTING
At time t m , when Bob receives a packet from the shared channel, it makes a noisy measurement z(m) of the pathloss (this could be done, e.g., using the pulse-based method discussed in [21] ). With z(m) in hand, Bob constructs the following More details about the THz-TDS setup can be found in [10] . binary hypothesis testing problem:
where
) is the distance-dependent pathloss of the channel between Alice (Eve) and Bob, and follows Eq. (1). Moreover, (m) is the estimation error assumed to be zero-mean Gaussian with variance σ 2 (m).
where σ 2 B is the variance of white Gaussian noise at Bob, K (m) is the length of the preamble preceding the data, P Tx (m) is the transmit power of the sender node 2 and c is a constant.
Dropping the time index m for simplicity, it is straightforward to see that z|H 0 ∼ N (PL AB , σ 2 ) while z|H 1 ∼ N (PL EB , σ 2 ). If H 0 = 1, received packet is accepted by Bob; if H 1 = 1, received packet is rejected by Bob.
Next, since the ground truth PL AB is known with sufficient accuracy (via prior training in the beginning, on a secure channel), Bob applies the following test:
where δ is the comparison threshold (a design parameter) whose value is to be determined.
C. ALGORITHMIC IMPLEMENTATION
The only thing further required to implement the hypothesis test of Eq. (3) is the value of threshold δ. In this work, we utilized Neyman-Pearson method which systematically computes the value of δ once provided with a maximum tolerable value of the probability of false alarm P fa (i.e., incorrectly identifying Alice's packet as if it is from Eve).
Let y = z − PL AB . Then, y|H 0 ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) and y|H 1 ∼ N (PL EB − PL AB , σ 2 ). Then, P fa is given as:
2 dt is the complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of standard normal distribution.
By setting P fa to the pre-specified value, δ can be calculated using Eq. (4) as:
At this point, it is worth mentioning that the computation of δ in Eq. (5) requires only the knowledge of variance σ 2 (of the pathloss measurement error ) which could be easily computed offline (i.e., before the authentication phase commences). Moreover, one can infer from Eq. (5) that the hypothesis of Eq. (3) remains effective as long as Eve doesn't adapt its transmit power which is indeed assumed in this work.
The proposed authentication method is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 The Proposed Authentication Method
Phase-I: Training (H 0 = 1) Bob learns the ground truth (i.e., PL AB ) on a secure channel Phase-II: Authentication while (1) do Bob computes the threshold δ from Eq. (5) Bob implements the binary hypothesis test in Eq. (3) to systematically accept/reject data packets end while
IV. PERFORMANCE OF THE PROPOSED METHOD A. DETECTION RATE
While carrying out hypothesis testing, Bob could make two kind of errors: i) Bob discards the data of Alice thinking that it came from Eve, the so-called probability of false alarm P fa , ii) Bob accepts the data coming from Eve thinking that it came from Alice, the so-called probability of missed detection P md .
In this work, we have employed Neyman-Pearson method which guarantees to minimize (maximize) P md (P d = 1−P md ), for a fixed/given value of P fa . Therefore, we proceed to compute the probability of missed detection P md (success probability of Eve) which is as follows:
Assuming that unknown pathloss PL EB is uniformly distributed within a reasonable range PL EB ∼ U( min , max ), we have the following expression:
A closed-form solution of Eq. (7) cannot be obtained because it involves the integration of the Q-function.
It is worth mentioning that Eq. (7) is typically solved offline (before the authentication phase commences) to obtain receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves. The only information missing to solve Eq. (7) are the limits of integration, i.e., min and max , which one can compute in a relatively straightforward manner provided that Bob knows the fixed transmit power P Tx used by the transmit nodes (Alice and Eve) which is indeed assumed in this work.
B. DEFLECTION COEFFICIENT
Another important performance metric of interest in Detection theory is Deflection coefficient, which quantifies the separation between two conditional probability densities of the test statistic under consideration. Larger the value of the deflection coefficient, better is the detection performance and vice versa. Specifically, the deflection coefficient for any binary hypothesis testing scheme is defined as:
where T is the test statistic of interest (defined in Eq. (3) for our proposed method). Then, one can verify that T in Eq. (3) has a folded normal distribution; therefore, E[T |H 0 ] = σ. √ 2/π and:
2 dt is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of standard normal distribution. Finally, Var(T |H 0 ) = σ 2 (1 − 2/π).
C. FEASIBLE AND NON-FEASIBLE REGIONS
As is suggested by Fig. 3 , pathloss, being distance-dependent, can indeed be used as device fingerprint provided that |d AB − d EB | ≥ η where η is a threshold. This in turn implies that |d AB −d EB | ≥ η corresponds to the feasible region (where the proposed authentication method meets the pre-specified performance requirements), while |d AB − d EB | < η corresponds to the non-feasible region (where the proposed authentication method breaks down).
Eqs. (8), (9) together reveal that ξ is solely a function of the two fingerprints PL AB and PL EB which in turn means ξ is a function of two distances, i.e., the distance between Alice VOLUME 5, 2017 FIGURE 4. The feasible and non-feasible regions for the proposed method: In this 2D map/layout, Bob is placed at origin, while Alice is located at a distance d AB from origin. Then if the Eve lies anywhere within the grey region, i.e., |d AB − d EB | < η, then ξ < β, and thus, α-level detection using proposed method is not feasible. However, when Eve is is anywhere in blue region, i.e., |d AB − d EB | ≥ η, then ξ ≥ β, and thus, α-level detection using proposed method is feasible.
and Bob d AB , and the distance between Eve and Bob d EB (see Eq. (1)). Similarly, from Eq. (7), one could deduce the same, i.e., P md is solely a function of the two fingerprints PL AB and PL EB (and hence a function of two distances d AB and d EB ). Fig. 4 then graphically illustrates that Deflection coefficient ξ and detection rate P d together could be utilized to identify the feasible and non-feasible regions for our proposed authentication scheme. Specifically, for a desired/prespecified minimum detection performance α (i.e., P d ≥ α), the following relations hold:
(where β and η are the thresholds).
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Owing to the fact that there aren't any nano-devices manufactured to date which could be leveraged to investigate the performance of the proposed authentication method in a real-time setting, this section provides extensive simulation results. Fig. 5 provides a quantitative example to illustrate that Deflection coefficient ξ and detection rate P d could indeed help us identify the feasible and non-feasible regions for our proposed authentication scheme (as discussed in Section IV-C earlier). Specifically, Fig. 5 states that the relations (10), (11) In such situation, flipping a coin to observe its output for decision making performs equally well as the proposed scheme. Fig. 6 also confirms the hypothesis that greater the ξ is, so is P d 3 (for a given P fa ). Finally, the zoomedin plot representing the case ξ = 166.71 (within Fig. 6 ) shows the typical trade-off between P d and P fa ; i.e., it is not possible to increase P d without sacrificing P fa and vice versa. Fig. 7 provides the graphical illustration of the working of Hypothesis test of Eq. (3) for 100 uses of the shared channel (we assume P(H 0 ) = P(H 1 ) = 0.5, i.e., we assume that at any given time-slot, Alice and Eve are equally likely to transmit). Since the hypothesis test of Eq. (3) essentially computes the absolute deviation of each (pathloss) measurement z from the ground truth PL AB and compares it with a pre-set threshold δ to make a decision, Fig. 7 provides us a way to visually spot and segregate the transmissions from the intruder node Eve (the transmissions with large magnitude/value of the test statistic T ), and the transmissions from the legitimate sender Alice (the transmissions with smaller magnitude/value of the test statistic T ).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a physical layer authentication scheme based on distance-dependent pathloss is studied for in-vivo nano networks at terahertz frequencies. For the proposed authentication scheme, detection performance has been investigated, and feasible and non-feasible regions are identified.
It is anticipated that this work will pave a way for designing secured, authenticated links for the future nano-networks. For example, this study has already pointed towards several directions for future research, e.g., incorporating the mobility of the nano nodes into the proposed authentication framework, design of cross-layer authentication schemes, combining multiple features for improved authentication performance etc.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The statements made herein are solely the responsibility of the authors. interests include small and compact antennas for wireless body-area networks, radio propagation characterization and modeling, antenna interactions with human body, computational electromagnetic, advanced antenna enhancement techniques for mobile and personal wireless communications, and advanced algorithm for smart and intelligent antenna and cognitive radio system. He is a member of the Institute of Bioengineering and Centre for Intelligent Sensing at QMUL. He has won the Isambard Brunel Kingdom Award, in 2011, for being an outstanding young science and engineering communicator. He was selected to deliver a TEDx talk about the science of electromagnetic and also participated in many public engagement initiatives and festivals. He is a member of the IET, a Fellow of the Higher Education Academy (U.K.) and also a College Member for Engineering and Physical Sciences Research (EPSRC, U.K.) and its ICT prioritization panels. He is an Elected Member of U.K. URSI (International Union of Radio Science) panel to represent the U.K. interests of URSI Commission B (from 2014 to 2017). He is also a Reviewer for many funding agencies around the world, including the Expert Swiss National Science Foundation Research, the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council, U.K., and the Medical Research Council, U.K. VOLUME 5, 2017 
